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Should the law concern itself with blasphemy? Following the Gojra massacre 
where eight Christians were killed after days of tension sparked by the rumoured 
desecration of a Quran, this question, as well as the debate on the blasphemy laws, 
whether they should be retained, reformed or abolished, has once again assumed 
major socio-legal importance. The arguments which characterise this debate raise 
fundamental issues about the relationship between law, religion, politics and culture 
in Pakistan and manifest some of the pivotal conflicts of Pakistani society today.
Major justifications for retaining laws against blasphemy, besides the obvious duty 
of a Muslim to protect the faith, include arguments about the relationship between 
religion and morality as well as the maintenance of public order. Both arguments 
reveal the general direction the Law has taken in this country. Both are also logi-
cally and empirically flawed.
 On talk shows and in the vernacular press is repeatedly reproduced Lord 
Devlin’s famous attack on the position which he characterises as a separation of law 
and morality. Lord Devlin’s justification: that ‘without the support of the Churches 
the moral order, which has its origin in and takes its strength from Christian beliefs, 
would collapse’, that ‘no society has yet solved the problem of how to teach moral-
ity without religion’, and that ‘without the help of Christian teaching the law will 
fail’.
 In Pakistan today, Devlin’s ghost speaks whenever the subject of blasphemy 
is raised. The law has to protect Islam because that means protecting ‘our system of 
morality’. But for such a justification to be tenable, it cannot stop at the argument 
about the enforcement of morals alone, but must go a step ahead and defend legal 
intrusion by showing that religious faith, and therefore moral beliefs, are actually 
sustained by such laws. Such a defence would be difficult to maintain for several 
reasons.
 One, it doesn’t seem that blasphemy laws have had much impact, one way 
or the other, on the level of religiosity. Two, the protection of religion for moral 
purposes is unfeasible in a society where some, even a few, base their morality – if 
it is accepted that morality does ensue from religion – on a religion other than the 
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dominant one. Indeed, there is enough evidence in Pakistan of the mischief created 
in the name of blasphemy.
 Most importantly, the argument about moral utility provides no rationale 
for restricting criminality only to abusive and offensive attacks upon religion. 295C 
of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 stipulates that any person who ‘by words, either 
spoken or written, or by visible representations, or by any imputation, innuendo, 
or insinuation, directly or indirectly’ defiles the name of the Prophet Mohammad 
(pbuh), is liable for blasphemy, and in addition to a fine, shall be punished with 
the death sentence or imprisonment for life. Such a law then stifles even the sober, 
balanced and well-reasoned critiques of societal attitudes and mores, which is an 
intolerable restriction on freedom of inquiry and clashes directly with the norms of 
democracy. In this case, then, the defence of a blasphemy law in terms of its moral 
utility seems entirely irrelevant.
 The second major argument for why the law should concern itself with blas-
phemy has to do with maintenance of public order. This is one of the most com-
monly cited reasons for limiting freedom of expression, accepted not just by theo-
logians and elements from the right but also by political thinkers such as JS Mill 
and John Rawls. However, if the law has to concern itself with religious expression 
because it may provoke breaches of peace, this does not justify a law that concerns 
itself specifically with blasphemy. Those who speak of reform or of abolishing the 
existing law of blasphemy are no less concerned about threats to public order than 
those in favour of the law. What they are arguing is that such threats should be dealt 
with not through blasphemy laws but by better laws of public order in general.
 It should be obvious, then, that while the defence of a blasphemy law in 
terms of its moral utility claims too much, appeals to public order prove too little.
 Indeed, the public order argument seems even more problematic given that 
since its enactment in 1986, 295C has frequently been misused to intimidate or 
punish religious minorities and to settle personal scores. Ironically, many moder-
ate Muslims have also fallen victim to the blasphemy laws. The mandatory capital 
punishment accompanying the charge is a matter of controversy even in Islamic 
circles. One could even argue that the very existence of laws regarding blasphemy 
promotes antagonism towards minorities and gives Muslim fanatics a warrant to 
take the law into their own hands.
 In several mosques, it is taught that those who commit blasphemy deserve 
to be killed; that protecting a blasphemer is as bad as blaspheming itself. One can 
be arrested for blasphemy without a warrant and imprisoned without bail. Many 
people accused of blasphemy have been killed while standing trial and lower courts 
have invariably awarded the death sentence to the accused because of threats from 
extremists groups.
121
Zahra-Malik
 At a broader level, then, the problem is about a societal attitude, a certain 
kind of mindset, that creates bad laws and also nourishes their misuse. Consider 
that in 2000, Lahore High Court Judge Mr Justice Nazir Akhtar publicly stated 
that it was the religious obligation of Muslims to kill on the spot anyone accused 
of blasphemy; for a blasphemer, there was no need for any legal proceedings. The 
statement reflects the extent of judicial bias on the subject. It also suggests how the 
Law tragically stands for certain enduring attitudes. The state and its branches have, 
for their own reasons, fallen for the agenda of the Right and created a schema which 
works to the advantage of the Right, such that we are grappling now not just with a 
bad law but with enduring attitudes that ensure that, in theory, even if this law were 
removed or changed, people would continue to be harassed and even killed.
 Consider that during the proceedings of one blasphemy case, the accusers 
built a gallows outside the courtroom to signify that even if the court found the ac-
cused not guilty, the crowds would carry out the required punishment themselves.
 As harsh as this may sound, the Pakistani state and public must acknowledge 
that characteristics usually connected with fascist movements are among some of 
those visible in extremist politics in Pakistan today: the systematic manipulation of 
ignorance, victimisation of members of a particular community, the use of uncon-
stitutional tactics against certain groups, and so on. Indeed, Gojra and similar inci-
dents are a classic example of the political use of people’s gullibility to engender 
extremism. The Muslims who were mobilised in Gojra accepted unreasoned claims 
by the inciters of violence as well as the bizarre ethical argument that these claims 
actually justified the killing of people.
 As complex and multi-dimensional as the situation is, a solution must come 
in the form of single-minded opposition by the public and the government. Ob-
scurantism thrives on lack of education and awareness. In Pakistan, the problem 
is exacerbated when to the traditional problem of illiteracy is added the danger of 
slanted instruction. The government must intervene on this count. As recommended 
by Amartya Sen and others regarding extremist politics in India, the weakest link in 
the extremist chain in Pakistan too is a basic reliance on ignorance. That is where a 
confrontation is most necessary.
 In simple terms, his would mean that political authorities must stop appeas-
ing the Right. Indeed, the appeal of fundamentalisms of all kinds in Pakistan has 
grown alongside the decline of the moral authority of the state. Around the world, 
there is a recrudescence of religion, partly attributed to the moral meaning of exis-
tence which modern institutions so thoroughly tend to dissolve. Even for developed 
democracies, the problem of how to combine resurgent pre-modern belief with an 
acknowledgment of the need for rationalisation and accommodation among differ-
ent interests, is a daunting one.
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 In Pakistan, where we still have to figure out the basics of law, politics and 
religion, blasphemy and laws regarding it could very well present one of the most 
decisive indicators of the future cultural and political direction of the state. By the 
same token, the crisis offers a chance to abandon the discourse of double standards 
and embrace the notion of the rights of every Pakistani as a Pakistani. In a country 
about which it is commonly asked whether it is possible to be both a non-Muslim 
and a Pakistani, perhaps a profound re-imagination of the nation itself is required.
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